2018年4月23日 星期一

這不是"競爭",那什麼才叫"競爭" --- Uber的一場反托拉斯官司


Uber進入任一城市,該城市傳統計程車業者的生意必受影響,而一般人的生理反射就直覺認為Uber未遵守現有的計程車監管,是一場"不公平"的競賽構成了競爭法的違法美國第三巡迴法院Philadelphia taxi Association Inc et al v Uber Technologies Inc,案告訴你,這種想法是錯的




背景說明
    20053月到201410美國費城的計程車都會被要求須具備有費城停管局(Philadelphia Parking AuthorityPPA)所核發的牌照(medallion)和公共便利標章(certificate of public convenience)牌照是一種資產可以用來質押借款購買車輛或是提升及改善服務品質只要牌照擁有者遵守計程車義務規範後即可獲得公共便利標章這些規範包括了安全保險司機最低工資流利的英文等之規定2005年時牌照的價值只有65,000但到了2014費城500家計程車公司的7,000位司機持有了1,610張牌照每張牌照的價值高達545,000
    201410Uber正式開始在費城營運,可是並沒有牌照和公共便利標章Uber也沒有自己的車輛及司機自然就不必對車輛負法律責任。在Uber營運的前兩年大約有1,200位計程車司機轉投入Uber的行列,加上新加入的500位司機,分食的結果使得傳統計程車營收減少了30%牌照的價值降為只值8萬元費城計程車公會 (PTA)75家費城計車公司乃向地區法院控訴Uber
1.     是屬休曼法第2條的企圖獨占(attempted monopolization)
2.     是屬賓州法的契約侵權行為
3.     是屬賓州法下的不公平競爭

地區法院駁回了以上的控訴,法院認為Uber進到費城後雖然傷害了傳統計程車的營業,但尚不構成反托拉斯法所要預防的傷害類型。PTA等不服上訴至第三巡迴上訴法院2018327日上訴法院駁回了上訴

上訴法院駁回理由

    上訴法院一開始就揭示:「競爭是反托拉斯法的核心。」(competition is at the heart of the antitrust laws.)而且反托拉斯法是在“保護競爭,而不是保護競爭者",因此只有當行為的效果傷害到了市場從而傷害了消費者,方才違反反托拉斯法。若要構成休曼法第2條的違法,原告必須證明:
1.被告從事了掠奪性(predatory)或反競爭的行為
2.獨占的具體意圖
3.達到獨占力的危險可能性(dangerous probability)
    對於以上待證的三事項以及傳統業者是否受到了反托拉斯傷害,分述如下。

從事了掠奪性或反競爭的行為
     PTA等認為Uber可以不遵守PPA的規範不必購買牌照不必支付司機最低工資也沒有任何保險,所以可以以較低營運成本的出租車來“淹沒"(flooded)整個費城計程車市場實屬掠奪性的行為
    但是這樣的看法並未獲上訴法院的接受上訴法院指出
1.     Uber的車輛縱使淹沒了費城計程車市場而排除了競爭對手也不是反競爭,相反地,它是以提供客戶更低的價格更多的出租車以及以高科技叫車和支付的方法等而促進了競爭。“降低價格以增加業務通常就是競爭的本質"(cutting prices in order to increase business often is the very essence of competition)不能只是因為業務的流失就認為是Uber反競爭的結果
2.     經營效率更高的事業應受到鼓勵因為這意味著市場參與者間的競爭加劇產品會更好消費者的價格會更低縱使Uber是因為未遵守PPA的規範而得以削減營運成本可是非法的行為不見得就非得以反托拉斯法來處理除非有反競爭效果的發生
3.     只有在某些情況下,雇用競爭對手員工方才可能反競爭,例如是以雇用競爭對手員工而不是以經營效率來企圖將對手排除在市場之外。

獨占的具體意圖
    PTA等指出Uber明明知道PPA對出租車輛會進行監管也知道它們的經營行為是非法的,Uber卻無視PPA規範的存在,這就是意圖獨占。
    上訴法院反駁道,縱使Uber違反了PPA的監管規定亦不能憑此就證明其有獨占的意圖Uber沒有自己的車輛和駕駛這只是它自己選擇的商業模式此一商業模式可能使得Uber更具有經營的效率而得以吸引更多的消費者從而獲取更多的市場占有率是以Uber所創造出來的商業模式競爭策略只是為了獲取客戶並不能因此認定其有獨占的意圖

達到獨占力的危險可能性
    PTA等認為Uber具有實現獨占力的危險可能性是因為它將很多的競爭對手趕出了市場一旦Uber成為市場的主要業者它就會收取更高的價格也會剝奪不使用智慧型手機的消費者在街上叫車的權利
    上訴法院指出
1.危險可能性是一項複雜且須“密集的事實調查"(fact-intensive inquiry)若要確定是否存在危險可能性通常需考慮諸如反競爭行為所引起的市場力參進障礙競爭的強度(the strength of competition)產業的可能發展消費者的需求彈性其中參進障礙又包括了監管的要求(regulatory requirements)高資本成本新競爭者進入市場的技術障礙但沒有任何一個因素是具有決定性的(no single factor is dispositive)
2. PTA等並沒有提到 Uber的市占率僅是提到201610Uber和傳統計程車在費城的車輛數另外參進障礙特別是參進的歷史證據是反托拉斯獨占案件中非常重要的考量因素Lyft這樣的競爭對手的存在顯然地說明了競爭者可以在無困難之下進入市場
3.至於Uber是否提高價格乙事上訴法院則引用了Uber辯護律師的看法Uber提高價格勢將鼓勵其他競爭對手進入市場收取低價與Uber競爭

反托拉斯傷害(antitrust injury)的看法
    PTA等辯稱Uber進入費城市場後造成了傳統計程車營收的下降這是Uber掠奪性行為所造成的反托拉斯傷害
    上訴法院指出反托拉斯傷害與違反反托拉斯法的反競爭行為效果之間必須存在有因果的關係,今天傳統業者營收的下降並不等於是損害了競爭,因Uber只是傷害了競爭對手,並未傷害到競爭的過程,既然如此,就不屬於是反競爭的行為。Uber的違法行為並不是反托拉斯傷害的基礎,在市場上競爭對手的違法行為亦不必然是反托拉斯法的違反。


後記
   當傳統的計程車業者例如台灣大車隊推出智慧型手機叫車服務讓你不用出門就可服務到家以手機追蹤計程車的行進路線-讓你有免除恐懼的自由直接信用卡付款讓你省卻攜帶現金的麻煩多元的車輛選擇讓你有貴婦般的尊榮請問這些改變是因為業者“良心"發現嗎?當然不是,這一切的改變都是Uber“競爭"的結果。
     “保護競爭,而不是保護競爭者"這句話,每位競爭法的執法者都琅琅上口,但真正認識它實踐它的又有幾位呢?當我們要使出一切手段阻擋類似Uber的新興商業模式進到市場時,若競爭法執法者只是單純的不作為,那就是在“保護競爭者,而不是保護競爭",所有的競爭法的執法者,尤其是後進者,自當如本案法官是也!

2018年4月22日 星期日

What is the Competition Market for Uber? An Empirical Assessment in Taiwan

It is my honor that Professor Chang agrees to post his article regarding Uber competition on my blog.  Professor Chang is one of the excellent scholars in the field of competition issue  in Taiwan. 



What is the Competition Market for Uber? An Empirical Assessment in Taiwan
Hung-Hao Chang


Ridesharing companies such as Uber are examples of companies taking advantage of advanced digital technology to disrupt the traditional transportation market. Uber, the most successful ride sharing economy business model, was launched in San Francisco city in U.S. in 2009, and it has expanded to many major countries worldwide. Registered as a technology company that manages a ridesharing platform to connect service providers and consumers, Uber uses a mobile application to match passengers with drivers of private vehicles through the application of an internet platform. Because Uber does not own its vehicles but only works with privately licensed drivers, Uber claims itself as a platform matchmaker rather than a transport provider. Uber drivers therefore do not have to comply with transportation and communication laws which are applied to taxi drivers.

Severe protests from taxi drivers against Uber have been found in many countries. Taxi drivers claim that Uber’s service is unregulated and uses potentially dangerous vehicles and untested private drivers to operate. Taxi drivers have urged the government to take legal action on Uber to avoid the unfair competition between Uber and taxi companies. Two interesting questions are then raised: (1) Does Uber compete with taxicabs in the same market? If not, there is no ground for taxi drivers to complain about. (2) Should Uber be regulated in the same way as taxis? From the view of competition laws, the answers of these two questions are closely relevant to an appropriate definition of a competition market for Uber. Although market definition is a longstanding research topic in antitrust analysis, defining a competition market for Uber is not obvious since it is registered as an IT company.

An empirical analysis was recently completed to address the above policy issues by assessing the impacts of Uber on taxi drivers’ economic outcomes and business strategies in Taiwan. The theoretical framework of this study is based on the theory of harm. If the presence of Uber affects taxi drivers, then Uber and taxi industry should be defined in the same competition market. Given that Uber entered Taipei city of Taiwan in 2013, this study examines the effect of Uber on taxi industry by comparing the performance of taxi drivers in Taipei City and the ones in other cities before and after the presence of Uber. Using a solid econometric analysis on a population-based survey of taxi drivers, it was found that Uber significantly reduced the service revenue and profit margin of taxi drivers who are the members of a taxi motorcade. In esponse to competition from Uber, it was also found that taxi drivers in Taipei City were more likely to adopt advertisements in or on their taxicabs compared to taxi drivers in other cities without Uber service. Additionally, there was a lower incidence rate of car accidents among taxi drivers in Taipei City, which may indicate that taxi drivers are providing better ride service as a strategy to cope with the competitive pressure from Uber.

To sum, a negative impact of Uber on taxi drivers' service revenue may suggest a substitution between Uber service and taxi operation. Taxi motorcades are directly competing with Uber which is because both taxi motorcades and Uber use a dispatching system in business operation. Accordingly, this study suggests that Uber probably has to be considered in the same competition market as the one with taxi motorcades.

The above post draws on material discussed at greater length in “The Economic Effects of Uber on Taxi Drivers in Taiwan”, recently published in volume 13, issue 3 of the Journal of Competition Law and Economics.

The author is a commissioner of the Taiwan Fair Trade Commission (TFTC), and a professor at the National Taiwan University. The view of the paper is on the author, but not the TFTC. E-mail: hunghaochang@ntu.edu.tw




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